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Productivity, Trade, and Institutional Quality:
A Panel Analysis
Eleanor Doyle* and Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso{
Recognizing that gains historically attributed to trade capture instead the roles of institutions
and geography, we estimate the relationship between labor productivity and trade for a panel of
countries, 1980 to 2000. We use real and nominal openness as measures of trade. The
endogeneity of trade and institutional quality is accounted for with instruments. Our trade
instrument is based on a theoretically motivated gravity equation and uses a more
comprehensive data set than in related studies. Fixed- and random-effects and system-GMM
panel estimation methods address potential biases associated with cross-section estimations.
We find a robust relationship between real openness and labor productivity from the 1990s.
Countries that trade more generate higher levels of productivity, supporting an institutional
theory of growth. We find evidence that countries with low-quality institutions benefit from
openness to trade and that the positive effect of trade on labor productivity is lower for more
populated countries.
JEL Classification: F14, F43, O40
1. Introduction
Interest in the relationship between trade and performance (variously taken as levels or
growth of output or productivity) is evident across an extensive range of economic research.
Empirical evidence points to a relationship between trade and income growth via productivity
through, for example, technology transfer effects and scale economies (see Yanikkaya 2003 for
a survey), although specific results vary with country sample, time period, and econometric
approach. The problematic nature of how to accurately construct and examine this causal
relationship is indicated by the range of theoretical investigations undertaken to date.
Developments in applied econometrics have generated varied approaches to investigate
how trade and performance are related, but more recent research has focused on whether
estimated links capture the roles of institutions and geography, rather than positive trade
effects. There is particular agreement that in focusing on improving understanding of the
determinants of economic performance, institutions and their differential quality across
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countries must be included (Levchenko 2007). Motivated by related literature we investigate the
effect of international trade and institutional quality on productivity across a sample of
approximately 100 countries1 from 1980 to 2000 going beyond the cross-section approach
associated with such empirical investigations to date. Our contributions include our focus on a
panel estimation approach, application of a theoretically motivated measure of trade using a
comprehensive data set, and a comprehensive measure of institutional quality.
The measurement of trade in this literature includes explicit examination of exports only
(in export-led growth studies) and their relationship with output, living standards, or
productivity. Related research includes openness as the measure of trade, taking into account
both exports and imports as separate but related channels that drive output or productivity
growth.2 The standard measure of openness is the sum of exports and imports expressed as a
fraction of GDP, in nominal terms. However, this measure creates difficulties if productivity
gains are greater in manufacturing than in services. Specifically, employing Openness as the
trade variable creates difficulties because of the potential impact of Balassa-Samuelson effects
that arise when wealthy trading economies experience higher consumer price levels than poorer
economies because of higher productivity in traded goods sectors being passed on via higher
prices to the sheltered parts of the economy.3 Similarly to Alcala and Ciccone (2004)4 we use
alternative versions of Openness to compare findings and extend their cross-country analysis to
a panel setting. To take account of the potential endogeneity of trade and institutional quality
and our dependent variable, Productivity, we use instruments. Following the work of Hall and
Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), the choice of instruments for
institutional quality rests on the relationship between historical European influence and
diffusion of the European institutional structure.
The work of North (1990) and Landes (1998), in particular, highlighted that differences in
income and growth are determined by the institutional framework and has been incorporated
into the trade/growth debate. North (1997, p. 114) in his 1993 Nobel lecture offered a definition
of institutions as ‘‘the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are
made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of
behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement
characteristics.’’
The proposition that weak economic institutions hinder growth is not particularly novel,
but an assumption of neoclassical economics that institutional competition and public choice
might reduce or eliminate them possibly explains their exclusion from research until recently.
Difficulties surrounding measurement in the context of the quotation above provides further
practical rationale for their exclusion. Related literature points to several alternative measures
to operationalize the concept. Furthermore, given the persistent nature of institutions
(Acemoglu and Johnson 2006) availability of sufficient appropriate data is problematic.
1 The list of countries included in our estimations is provided in Appendix Table A1.
2 Although we acknowledge that trade volumes and openness are not conceptually the same and thank a referee for
focusing attention on this issue (e.g., a large country open to trade but isolated geographically is but indicative of this
argument), we follow convention and use the terms interchangeably to denote trade volumes.
3 The trade-related Balassa-Samuelson (Balassa 1964; Samuelson 1964) hypothesis implies that if trade increases
productivity, where gains are greater in manufacturing than in nontradable services, a rise in the relative price of
services might result in a decrease in nominal openness.
4 See also Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) and Dollar and Kraay (2003).
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Our article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background literature on the
trade-growth relationship identifying those challenges associated with measures of Openness
and Institutional Quality in empirical work. In Section 3 the selected productivity equation we
estimate is presented with detailed discussion of the instruments, because a thorough empirical
examination must address issues of endogeneity. Analysis and findings based on our estimated
results are provided in section 4, and our summary and conclusions are offered in section 5.
2. Empirical Relationships: Trade, Growth, and Productivity
Many arguments potentially explain why trading countries experience higher output or
productivity than their more closed counterparts. Open economies can benefit from
specialization, which allows for the generation of higher levels of income due to comparative
advantage. When more of a country’s available resources are devoted to producing goods in
which it has comparative advantages (i.e., lower opportunity costs of production) and it can
import the goods in which it is less efficient, overall national output and consumption are
higher than under autarky. Through creating international demand for domestic resources that
might otherwise remain unused, a further (demand-side) basis for making more efficient use of
resources exists in relation to trade. Static effects of specialization change the economy’s
production (and labor) mix in line with comparative advantage, and this, coupled with the
ability to trade at international prices, leaves consumers better off. If dynamic benefits also
accrue, as markets and market access expand, the potential for greater division of labor arises,
and the skills of labor may rise in response to greater division of labor. Hence, productivity
improvements are observed in an outward expansion of the production possibilities frontier
(Myint 1958).
As trade expands, the potential to exploit international communication of ideas and
technology increases and may intensify competition in both import and export markets,
increasing incentives for both imitation and innovation and accelerating the rate of technical
progress that can lead to efficiency gains through more competitive cost structures and
productivity improvement. Connolly (2003) notes that developing countries rely more heavily
on trade (focusing on imports of high technology goods) than do developed countries as a
source of productivity growth. Furthermore, foreign exchange constraints may also be eased
because increased exports provide a source of foreign exchange for countries that wish to
purchase imports of final products or inputs that embody domestically unavailable technology.
The extent to which positive externalities are generated from involvement in international
markets, through resource allocation, economies of scale, and pressure on new training, for
example, underpin how the hypothesis operates in practice (Medina-Smith 2001). Analyses of
such issues are evident in the substantial export-led-growth literature (theoretically associated
with the view of trade as an engine of growth), in the alternative causal explanation manifest in
Verdoorn’s law (as explained in Kaldor 1967)5 and in studies investigating bidirectional
5 The positive impact on productivity growth of output growth was attributed to economies of scale, learning curve
effects, increased division of labor, and the creation of new processes and subsidiary industries. Productivity growth in
the industrial sector, in particular, is considered as the principal determinant of output growth, and improved
productivity and reductions in unit costs due to increasing returns simply make ‘‘it easier to sell abroad’’ (Kaldor 1967,
p. 42) implying a causal relationship from output growth, via productivity growth, to export growth.
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causality that may arise when productivity increases that are made through the exploitation of
scale economies lead to increased exports (Kunst and Marin 1989), which can occur if the
market structure changes (brought about by increased trade) result in fewer firms and if scale
economies allow for increased competitiveness through further cost reductions.6
In the context of new trade theory, models have been developed indicating how
international trade leads to growth by increasing the number of specialized production inputs
(Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991). Helpman and
Krugman (1985) show that this outcome is ambiguous, and Grossman and Helpman (1991)
also pointed out that tariffs could be growth reducing. Yanikkaya (2003) indicates how trade
restrictions can promote growth, under particular conditions and especially for developing
countries.
Hence, before the inclusion of (explicit) measures of ‘‘institutions’’ research indicated that
the impact of trade on growth was equivocal—dependent on market competition, market
contestability, and whether the market structure was stable with regard to trade disturbances or
might be altered and lead to productivity improvements and changes in technical efficiency.
Building on such findings, more recent examinations of trade and growth focus on the extent to
which output or productivity changes attributed to trade instead measure the effects of
institutions and geography, rather than strictly trade.
The Role of Geography in Explaining Income
A positive correlation between trade and income found in many studies could as validly
mean that countries with higher incomes engage in more trade rather than assuming causality
from trade to income. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of income on trade neglect the
endogeneity of trade and, therefore, fail to accurately identify its effect on income.
Frankel and Romer (1999) outline the difficulty in trying to find if trade causes growth
since if the trade share (or openness) is endogenous, countries with high incomes (or
productivity) due to reasons other than trade may trade more. Because geography is a strong
determinant of trade—as gravity models indicate (e.g., Linneman 1966; Frankel 1997)—and
geographical characteristics are not affected by income, a geography-based trade instrument
may be estimated. The role of geography in economic growth arises because of geographic
conditions that favor economic activity of various types: Access to natural resources, access to
coastline and sea for accessing external markets, proximity to strong economies, appropriate
resources to support agriculture, and the general conditions supporting human health status,
for example, are relevant (Sachs 2000). As the literature indicates, separating the trade effects
from nontrade effects in the context of geographical measures proves to be an informative and
fruitful line of inquiry in trade-growth analysis.
Frankel and Romer (1999) addressed the simultaneity issue by conducting a two-stage
procedure including constructing an instrument using countries’ geographic attributes (notably
distance from trade partners) that are correlated with trade but uncorrelated with income. In a
cross section of countries (98 in their sample) using 1985 trade data, they find that the effect of
trade on income is considerably higher (although imprecisely estimated) with instrumental
variables (IV) estimation, suggesting that the positive association of trade and income is not
6 Hence a potential feedback effect exists between export growth and output such as considered in Doyle (2001).
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entirely attributable to high-income countries trading more. Trade raises income, through
accumulation of physical and human capital and by increasing output for given levels of
capital. The OLS method understates the effects of trade, and in the IV estimation a 1%
increase in trade shares raises income (per capita) by between 1.5% and 2% (across different
sample specifications).
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) highlighted the potential for upward bias to the IV estimate
unless controls for additional channels (public health, quality of institutions, natural
endowments) were included in the trade-growth analysis. They ran the Frankel and Romer
regressions extended to incorporate distance from the equator, the percentage of a country’s
land area that is in the tropics, and a set of regional dummies. All additional variables displayed
highly significant coefficients, suggesting that the Frankel-Romer estimates captured such
nontrade effects on income. They found that the IV estimates became statistically insignificant
(reduced below the OLS) and concluded that the nontrade effects of geography were the main
driving forces behind their findings.
Subsequent research by Irwin and Tervio (2002) using the Frankel-Romer method over
the twentieth century (across subperiods 1913–1995) generated consistent findings across the
period. Although addressing the critique of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) did not significantly
affect the OLS results, it eliminated the consistent relationship between trade and income in the
IV regressions over the entire period. They concluded that trade is measured with substantial
error and/or it is an imperfect proxy for other income-enhancing interactions between nations.
As identified in Alcala and Ciccone (2004), potential deficiencies arise in using the
standard measure of the trade share, openness (nominal exports plus imports expressed relative
to nominal GDP). If trade increases productivity, where gains are greater in manufacturing
than in nontradable services, a rise in the relative price of services might result in a decrease in
openness. They estimate a measure of real openness7 in a cross-country analysis of the trade-
productivity relationship also using 1985 trade data. Their proposed real openness measure uses
exports and imports in exchange rate US$, and GDP is measured at PPP US$ prices that are
comparable across countries. They find higher real openness is directly associated with higher
trade rather than cross-country differences in the relative price of nontradable goods. The trade
instrument constructed is based on a comprehensive data set with 2.5 times the observations
used in Frankel and Romer (1999), and the same data source8 is used in both cases. Trade is
found to be a significant and robust determinant of aggregate productivity with an elasticity of
approximately 1.2.
Using a comprehensive data set9 containing over 270% more observations on bilateral
trade than used in Frankel and Romer (1999), Noguer and Siscart (2005, p. 451) explained the
contribution of this additional data in the following terms:
…previous studies faced a shortage in data availability for bilateral trade. To overcome this
limitation, the authors imputed ‘‘geographically’’ constructed trade shares … to country pairs
for which they lacked bilateral trade data but for which they had geographical and population
data (the gravity regressors). … As a consequence, they obtain a relatively weak instrument,
especially for those countries for which they had no bilateral trade data at all. In the 98-country
sample of Frankel and Romer (1999), a total of 45 countries belong to this group of no
7 Real openness is measured as nominal openness deflated with the consumer price index. Data are from the Penn World
Tables.
8 That is, Direction of Trade Statistics of the IMF.
9 World Trade Database (issue 1997).
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available bilateral trade data. … By using a larger data set that allows us to avoid imputation,
we get a more powerful instrument. The F-statistic of the exclusion of the instrument from the
First Stage for the set of countries for which Frankel and Romer had no bilateral trade data
increases from 0.27 to 7.3. For the overall sample, it increases from 8.85 to 35.48.
The result was a statistically significant stronger instrument for their estimations of specifications
(following Frankel and Romer 1999 and Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001). The effect of including
geographical controls reduced the elasticity of income (per capita) to trade share from 2.5 to
between 0.9 and 1.3, and in each specification the coefficient was statistically significant.
To investigate the nontrade effects of geography on income in the context of valid
instrumental variables, they examined which geographical variables could be deemed
independent determinants of income and suitable for inclusion as controls and which
geographical variables (if any) were significantly correlated with the selected instrument. The
variables of potential significance for the determination of income were considered as latitude
(impacting via institutions) and the percent of population in the tropics (impacting via disease
and morbidity), in line with McArthur and Sachs (2001). In the presence of correlation with the
instrument, respecification of the income-trade relationship was required,10 and the trade
coefficient was estimated at 1.04. Several proxies for institutional quality were also included as
controls to consider the sensitivity of the estimated trade coefficient, which remained robust
around 1 and retained its statistical significance.
Institutions Determining Economic Performance
The role and importance of institutions has been examined extensively in, for example, La
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2003), with agreement that
institutions matter for economic performance and are differentiated across northern and
southern outcomes. Easterly (2001) outlines that basic institutional requirements to facilitate
economic performance include protection of property rights, rule of law, efficient bureaucracy,
corruption-free government, and political constraint on the executive. Rather than being
defined as ‘‘proximate determinants’’ of economic growth, investment in physical and human
capital offer a potential for growth that without supporting institutions—the ultimate causes of
growth—cannot be exploited. Over a number of studies Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2003)
identify that weak (strong) institutional quality causes lower (higher) per capita income and
higher (lower) macroeconomic volatility. They focus particularly on the ‘‘historically
determined component of institutions’’ (2003, p. 71) and do not address the potential
contributory role of trade to macroeconomic outcomes.
The authors cited in this section consider institutions as a more significant explanatory
variable than geography, the rationale being that once the impact of institutions is included,
geography adds little to explaining cross country difference in income—a finding, therefore, at
odds with the conclusion of the supremacy of geography in Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999,
2001).
Just how best to measure institutions is not entirely clear. Temple’s (1999) review of
empirical growth literature identified research that, before publication of the Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW) Index, examined the role of institutions for economic outcomes:
10 If latitude and tropical population are determinants of income, they could be relegated to the error term once neither
was correlated with the instrument.
Productivity, Trade, and Institutions 731
Keefer and Knack (1995) using indicators of property rights (subsequently used in the
definition of ‘‘social infrastructure’’ in Hall and Jones 1999), Mauro (1995) using measures of
corruption, and Barro (1997) using an indicator of political rights. The breadth of measures
used arises as Levchenko (2007, p. 791) explains, because the term institutions ‘‘typically refers
to a wide range of structures that affect economic outcomes: contract enforcement, property
rights, investor protection, the political system, and the like.’’
The EFW Index (Gwartney and Lawson 2003; Gwartney, Holcombe, and Lawson 2004;
Gwartney 2009)11 measures institutional quality across five dimensions, namely:
N Size of government
N Legal structure and security of property rights
N Access to sound money
N Freedom to trade internationally
N Regulation of capital, labor, and business
offering both a multifaceted, ‘‘reliable and useful’’ (de Haan, Lundstrom, and Sturm 2006)
composite measure of institutional quality that focuses more on formal constraints on
interactions rather than informal behavioral or chosen conducts that also play a role.
This article reexamines the relationship between labor productivity and trade openness
and institutions, favoring labor productivity over income because of an interest in the
productive performance of economies rather than on income or living standards, although
clearly all are closely related with their divergence depending on unemployment, demographic
structure (dependency), and labor force participation. Our estimating approach follows the
literature in employing instruments for trade openness and institutions. The main innovation is
that we employ repeated cross sections compared to a single cross section of one year (usually
1985) widely used in this literature thus far. This permits a consideration of a wider a range of
sensitivity and robustness analyses relating to the finding that countries that trade more
experience higher levels of income.
Fixed- and random-effects and system-GMM panel estimation methods are used to
address potential biases associated with cross-section estimations such as small sample bias,
omitted variable problems, and endogeneity of explanatory variables. Furthermore, we use rich
data sets for our trade and institutions instruments, removing any need to rely on imputation of
missing data.
3. Estimation Approach
In our approach Labor Productivity is determined by the amount of trade a country
engages in, own country size (measured by Population and physical Area), Institutional
Quality, with geographical control variables also included, as follows, for the benchmark year:
log
PPPGDPit
Workforceit
 
~ aiza1Tradeitza2 log Popitza3 log Areaiza4IQualitza5Xitzuit, ð3:1Þ
11 The authors are grateful to Jim Gwartney and Bob Lawson for making the data available at http://www.freetheworld.
com.
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where PPPGDPit/WORKFORCEit denotes Labor Productivity per worker in country i. Trade
denotes measures of Openness, and we consider both nominal and real Openness here.12 As
Openness is measured relative to GDP, it offers one indicator of the importance of the size of
the economy for economic performance. Two further measures indicate economy size: Pop
represents domestic scale of production measured as population, and Area denotes the land
area in square kilometers. These are included because the size or scale of a country impacts not
only its propensity to trade externally but also internally (see Frankel and Romer 1999, p. 380);
a larger country would be expected to offer more opportunities for within-country trade.
Hence, a further geography-based test of trade’s impact is considered by examining whether
intracountry trade increases productivity, focusing on whether larger countries, measured by
population, generate higher productivity. IQual denotes institutional quality, and X represents
geography control variables. Finally, uit denotes the error term, assumed to be well behaved.
Data for productivity, nominal imports, and exports, GDP in PPP US$ used to measure
openness, and population to measure scale are taken from the Penn World Tables, 6.2 (Heston,
Summers, and Aten 2006). Area is taken from the World Development Indicators (2005) of the
World Bank.
Our measure of Institutional Quality for the period 1980–2000 is sourced from the
Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFWI). Data are available annually beginning in
2000, and so we use data for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 for our purposes. We build a
subindex that is based on four of the five components of the EFWI. We exclude freedom to
trade internationally, because this component is closely associated with openness. Although the
EFWI is built using perception-based13 indicators, and thus measures the perceived level of
institutional quality, we use it in the empirical analysis for two reasons. Not only is it available
since the early 1980s, meeting our time dimension requirements, but it also covers both
developed and developing countries we wish to include in our sample and, being based on a
large number of different sources, reduces potential data bias. We are aware of the weaknesses
of the data in the early years of the sample, and this is taken into account when evaluating
results. Our selected variables allow us to take a minimum of 98 countries for which required
data are available for 1980, 1985, and 1990. For 1995 and 2000 data a further 14 countries are
available (see Appendix Table A1). As our sample is very close to the 98-country sample used
in Frankel and Romer (1999) and Noguer and Siscart (2005), we are able to compare our
results with their findings.
To instrument for institutional quality, Hall and Jones (1999) use the population share
speaking English since birth, the population share speaking one of the five primary European
languages, distance from the equator, and Frankel and Romer’s (1999) geography-based trade
measure.14 We find the population share speaking English statistically significant and include it
with geography control variables including distance from the equator (measures used in Hall
12 Real openness is national imports plus exports (in US$) divided by national GDP in PPP US$.
13 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) argue that perceptions-based data provide valuable insights relative to
objective data on governance.
14 Hall and Jones (1999) considered that the first three variables are correlated with historical influence of Europe and
with providing a channel for the European institutional framework to have a growth impact. Alcala and Ciccone
(2004) drop the fraction of English-speaking population, finding it does not support prediction of the endogenous
variables in the specifications used. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) use European settler mortality during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as an instrument.
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and Jones, 1999)15 and continent dummies for Europe, Africa, and Asia-Pacific, where the
omitted dummy represents America.
To develop our instrument for trade, Frankel and Romer’s (1999) method is followed
where a gravity equation is used to estimate bilateral trade shares based on countries’
geographic characteristics and size. The data set used is a panel data set of bilateral trade flows
across 178 countries for each year we consider between 1975 and 2000 (i.e., annual data). The
data are from Rose (2005).16 This represents a substantial increase on the data set used by
Frankel and Romer (1999), Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001), and Noguer and Siscart (2005) of
approximately 100 countries to instrument for trade.
In our specification of the bilateral trade equation the dependent variable is total trade
relative to PPP GDP (Tradeijt/PPPGDPi) in logs. We include log population and log area as
measures of size, log distance as measure of transport costs, and a number of dummy variables
that proxy for countries’ geographic characteristics and integration agreements. In addition, we
include trading partners’ dummies as proxies for multilateral resistance terms, which Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) argued must be included to have a theoretically justified gravity-model
specification. Thus, the gravity equation we estimate is given by
ln (Tradeijt

PPPGDPi)
~cizxjzQtzb1lnPopitzb2lnPopjtzb3ln(AiAj)zb4lnDistijzb5Landl
zb6Langijzb7Adjijzb8Islandijzb9Comcolijzb10Currcolijzb11CUij
zb12Colonyijzb13RTAijtzb14Gw1zb15Gw2zb16Gspzmijt, ð3:2Þ
where i denotes the exporter, j denotes the importer, and t denotes the year. The explanatory
variables ci and xj are exporter and importer country dummies, Pop is population, A is area,
Dist is the distance between i and j, Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the country
pair, Lang is a dummy variable that is unity if i and j have a common language and zero
otherwise, Adj is a dummy variable that is unity if i and j have a common border and zero
otherwise, Island is the number of island nations in the pair i, j, Comcol is a dummy variable
that is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with the same colonizer, Currcol is a binary
variable that is unity if i and j are colonies at time t, CU is a binary variable that is unity if i and
j use the same currency at time t, Colony is a binary variable that is unity if i ever colonized j or
vice versa, RTA is a binary variable that is unity if i and j belong to the same regional trade
agreement, Gw1 and Gw2 are binary variables that are unity if i and j are GATT/WTO
members, respectively, and Gsp is a binary variable that is unity if i extends the GSP to j or vice
versa. Here mijt represents other omitted influences in bilateral trade.
The aggregated bilateral trade shares predicted by the gravity equation provide a
geography-based instrument for trade for each of the countries we include in the estimation of
our productivity equation (Appendix Figure A1 offers a plot of predicted trade shares and real
openness).
15 The authors are grateful to Robert Hall for making the data available at http://stanford.edu/*rehall/index_files/
Page1379.htm.
16 The authors are grateful to Andrew K. Rose for making the data available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/
RecRes.htm#Trade.
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4. Descriptive Statistics and Estimation Results
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for selected variables.
Real Openness displays a lower mean than Openness, and the correlation between the log of
Openness and the log of Real Openness is high at 0.73. The log of Real Openness is more highly
correlated with log Labor Productivity than Openness (compare 0.60 and 0.28).
The results of testing for the Balassa-Samuelson effect are provided in Table 2. We regress
the price level on Real Openness and other variables included in the productivity equation. Both
fixed-effects and random-effects two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimations were conducted, and
all geography controls and a constant were also included. Results indicate that Real Openness has
a highly significant positive effect on the price level for specifications including and excluding
institutional quality, confirming the trade-related Balassa-Samuelson effect in our sample. Our
range of coefficients on Real Openness (between 0.53 and 0.71) is higher than that estimated in
Alcala and Ciccone (of 0.31), indicating the highly positive impact of a geography-based
instrument of trade on the price level and emphasizing the need to take it into account.
Instruments Estimation
Table 3 contains the first-stage regression results for Real Openness and for our measure of
Institutional Quality. Our geography-based trade instrument is a statistically significant
determinant (1%) of Real Openness in all periods, when controlling for population,
area, distance from equator, fraction of population speaking English, and the continental
dummies. The F-statistic for the hypothesis that our instrument can be excluded from the
regression is statistically significant over all periods, indicating the appropriateness of its inclusion.
Results of the first-stage regression for our proxy of Institutional Quality indicate that the
fraction of population speaking English (englfrac) is statistically significant for all time periods,
except 1980. Distance to the equator is statistically significant in all periods but 2000. Neither
Population nor Area is significant.17 Notably, the F-statistic is consistently lower in results when
compared with those for log real openness, indicating the instruments are weaker in this case.18
Still, the hypothesis that our instrument can be excluded from the regression finds no support
over all periods.
Productivity, Institutions, and Trade
We present cross-section results for our five selected years (1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000)
to consider the stability and evolution of the estimated coefficients. Table 4 reports our results
using 2SLS estimation19 when examining the effect of trade on labor productivity.
We find that in 1980 Institutional Quality and two of the continent dummies are
statistically significant in explaining labor productivity. Results for 1985 reveal the same two
continent dummies Area and Institutional Quality as statistically significant. In these two years,
1980 and 1985, trade measured as real openness does not have an explanatory role for labor
17 The fraction of population speaking one of the main five languages in Europe was initially included, but it was always
insignificant and was not included in the final regressions.
18 We also used the variable ‘‘legal origin’’ as an additional instrument for institutional quality (http://rru.worldbank.
org/Documents/DoingBusiness/2004/DB2004-full-report.pdf) with no significant change in results.
19 The Stata command ivreg2 with the gmm2s, small, and robust options was used for the estimations.
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productivity, and the amount of variance explained by our regressors is the lowest across our
sample periods. For 1990 and 1995 Institutional Quality retains significance in explaining
productivity as well as Real Openness and two continent dummies. For 2000, Real Openness,
Institutional Quality, and the Africa dummy display statistically significant coefficients (1%).
The impact of a 1% change in trade (openness) on productivity is estimated at between 0.58%
and 0.67%, which is an economically significant impact on labor productivity. Our measured
impact lies below the range of estimates of around 1% (for 1985) presented in Noguer and
Table 2. Testing for the Balassa-Samuelson Effect (Panel-2SLS)
Dep. Var. lprice
Without IQual With IQual
Fe Re Fe Re
lropen 0.552* 0.527* 0.691* 0.712*
2.723 4.301 2.961 9.653
lpop 20.611+ 0.047 20.337 0.115*
22.161 1.039 20.925 3.991
larea 0.080* 0.053*
3.133 2.981
ldisteq 0.002 0.018
0.047 0.582
daustrasia 20.168 20.250*
21.524 23.178
dafrica 0.041 20.097
0.354 21.34
deurope 0.016 20.084
0.122 20.834
y85 20.061 20.146+ 20.019 20.053
20.851 22.373 20.254 21.282
y90 0.033 20.184* 20.080+
1.007 22.839 0.003 22.347
y95 0.046. 20.325* 20.065 20.196*
1.736 23.771 21.021 26.349
y2000 20.529* 20.150. 20.311*
23.952 21.952 29.471
IQual 20.063 0.171.
21.234 1.747
cons 8.080* 20.023 4.694 0.003
2.65 20.035 1.146 0.006
R2 0.639 0.537 0.648 0.637
N 492 492 544 544
F_f 8.540 8.6689
F_fp 0.000 0.000
Hausman 1.18 20.33
Prob. 0.97 0.002
T-statistics are reported below each coefficient, and ., +, and * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is lprice, the log of the price level. Fe denotes fixed effects estimation,
and Re denotes random effects estimation. lropen is real openness defined as the log of trade at exchange rate US$
relative to GDP at PPP US$. This variable is instrumented with the trade shares predicted by the gravity equation; lpop
is the log of population, and ldisteq is the distance from the equator. daustrasia, dafrica, and deurope are regional
dummies that take the value of one when a given country is located in the region, and zero otherwise. IQual is
institutional quality instrumented using four components of the EFW index, excluding freedom of trade. F_f is the F-
statistic for the first stage regression, and F_fp is the associated probability. Hausman is a Hausman test for which the
null hypothesis is orthogonality between the regressors and the unobserved heterogeneity, and Prob. denotes the
associated probability.
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Siscart (2005): Their coefficient on trade varied with inclusion of alternative measures of
institutional quality, including the International Country Risk Guide Index,20 corruption (one
element in the ICRG), and constraints on the executive from Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001). Our results for 1990, 1995, and 2000 are more robust than those obtained in
our earlier years, as indicated by improved explanatory power and the F-statistic.21
Having controlled for trade, institutions, and scale/size effects, our continent dummies
indicate that labor productivity is lower in the African continent and in Asia-Pacific than in
North America, our default dummy. The evolution over time shows that in Africa and Asia-
20 An average of five indicators of the quality of public governance: (1) the extent of government corruption, (2) efficacy
of the rule of law, (3) perceived efficiency of the government bureaucracy, (4) perceived risk of repudiation of
contracts by the government, and (5) average protection against expropriation risk sourced from IRIS Centre
(University of Maryland), from monthly International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data provided by Political Risk
Services Group.
21 We examined the possibility of separating the elements contained in the aggregated Economic Freedom of the World
index, but issues of high correlation precluded their simultaneous inclusion in estimations.
Table 4. Instrumental Variables Results (2SLS)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
lropen 0.631 0.225 0.667+ 0.602. 0.579+
0.955 0.450 2.006 1.911 2.447
IQual 0.590. 0.524+ 0.365+ 0.411+ 0.535*
1.67 2.207 2.229 2.541 3.189
lpop 20.015 20.095 0.082 0.016 0.034
20.09 20.594 0.976 0.242 0.568
larea 0.099 0.102. 0.04 0.08 0.064
1.35 1.685 0.87 1.54 1.066
ldisteq 0.167 0.127 0.102 0.161 0.128
1.127 1.178 0.984 1.51 1.206
daustrasia 20.759+ 20.565+ 20.663* 20.312. 20.172
22.411 22.413 23.272 21.728 21.002
dafrica 21.082. 20.902* 20.881* 20.606* 20.551+
21.95 23.545 23.541 22.737 22.447
deurope 20.402 20.016 20.301 0.032 0.002
20.806 20.056 21.137 0.124 0.01
cons 3.588 5.977* 4.411* 4.205* 3.340*
1.557 3.048 3.192 3.653 3.221
R2 0.427 0.557 0.689 0.684 0.727
N 98 98 98 106 101
J 0.938 3.563 2.079 1.379 1.205
Jp 0.333 0.059 0.149 0.240 0.272
estat 8.572 4.420 4.323 7.022 5.855
estatp 0.014 0.110 0.115 0.030 0.054
T-statistics are reported below each coefficient, and ., +, and * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable lprod is log of real labor productivity, GDP per person employed; lropen is
real openness defined as the log of trade at exchange rate US$ relative to GDP at PPP US$; IQual is institutional quality
constructed using four components of the EFW index; lpop is the log of population; larea is the area of the country in
natural logs, and ldisteq is the distance from the equator in natural logs. dafrica, deurope, and daustrasia are regional
dummies that take the value of one when a given country is located in the region, and zero otherwise. Hansen J test of
overidentifying restrictions, acceptance of the null hypothesis, indicates that the instruments are valid (results indicate
acceptance of H0). The last two rows report the Durbin-Wu-Hausman of endogeneity of lropen and IQual and the
associated probability of acceptance (the results from the tests indicate rejection of H0). OLS results are provided in the
Appendix for comparison.
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Pacific the negative differential has somewhat decreased, with the latter dummy no longer
significant in 2000.
For completeness, we also ran OLS regressions for each year using the two alternative
measures for the openness variable, with our results provided in Appendix Table A2. Our
estimated impact on productivity of a 1% change in trade lies between 0.5% and 0.54%, again
both statistically and economically significant. The coefficients are generally more precisely
estimated under OLS than under 2SLS, because the standard errors are almost always lower.
We perform Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of the hypothesis that Openness and Institutional
Quality are uncorrelated with the residuals, and thus OLS are unbiased. For most of the
coefficients and years we can marginally reject the hypothesis that the OLS and the 2SLS
estimates are equal: Results from diagnostic tests are shown in the last two rows of Table 4.
Both tests are, in the usual classical statistical sense, conservative about concluding
endogeneity. If theory or evidence from other studies or even common sense suggests
endogeneity, this may suffice to proceed with the 2SLS regardless of the results of the test. In
this case, it is convenient to report both the OLS and the IV estimates and the test results, and
we interpret the findings from the analysis accordingly.
Similarly to Frankel and Romer (1999), our results show that the IV and OLS estimates of
the trade impact never differ substantially and that moving from OLS to IV increases the
estimated impact of both trade and country size on productivity. Interestingly, with respect to
institutional quality, moving from OLS to IV significantly increases the estimated impact of this
variable on labor productivity in our yearly estimations.22
We also present results for the whole panel (an unbalanced panel with a maximum of 512
observations), permitting us to estimate an ‘‘average effect’’ by running a single regression
incorporating individual effects and time dummies for the five years analyzed. Both Real
Openness and Openness (nominal) were treated as alternative dependent variables and
compared over several alternative specifications. Results are shown in Table 5.
We first estimated a pooled-OLS model (1) with time effects (see columns 2 and 9 for Real
Openness and Openness, respectively). In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity we also
estimated the whole panel using a within-2-ways fixed-effects (fe) estimator and the generalized
least squares random-effects (re) estimator (fe and re results are presented in columns 3 and 4
for Real Openness; 10 and 11 for Openness). A Breusch-Pagan test indicates that we may reject
the null hypothesis of zero variance of the individual effects, and, therefore, the re model is
preferred to the pooled model. However, a Hausman test indicates that we reject the null
hypothesis of orthogonality between the random effects and the regressors, implying that only
the fe estimates are consistent.
22 We also used 3SLS estimation, which provides a comprehensive and, arguably, more complete estimation method
across the system of equations that characterize the relationships among our variables of interest. To conserve space
these results are available from the authors on request. By using 3SLS we further control for cross-correlation of the
residuals in the three different equations. 3SLS combines the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique with the
2SLS technique, and it is, therefore, more accurate. Although we observe that some of the coefficients are higher in
magnitude than those obtained with the 2SLS method (Real openness and Area), our main results are unchanged in
that Real Openness, Institutional Quality, Area, and Distance, and the continent dummies are statistically significant
variables in explaining labor productivity, whereas population is not. The size of the impact of trade on labor
productivity is higher according to this method at 0.7% for a given 1% change.
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We find that most of the variability of the data is across countries rather than within
countries, because the within-country variability is substantially reduced (R2 remains around
0.22).
The main difficulty in controlling for the endogeneity of some of the regressors in a panel-
data model with fixed effects is that most of the available instruments for the institutional
quality variable are time invariant, preventing us from using an instrumental variable estimator
with fixed effects, because in this case we are able to explain only the within variation of the
dependent variable not being able to obtain coefficients for the time-invariant variables or to
use instruments that are time invariant.
We consider three approaches to deal with these issues. First, the Hausman-Taylor
estimator can be computed that lies between the within-fixed effects and the GLS-random-
effects estimators and considers some variables as endogenous and correlated with the
unobserved heterogeneity, while treating others as exogenous. The endogenous variables are
then instrumented by using the values of the given variables averaged over time. We consider
Openness and Institutional Quality as endogenous and the rest of regressors as exogenous. The
results are presented in columns 5 and 11. A second option is to consider a GLS-2SLS-random-
effects model that uses external instruments for the endogenous variables, results for which are
presented in columns 6 and 12. Finally, the third option is to eliminate the unobserved
heterogeneity by taking first differences of the time-variant variables and estimate the model by
using the generalized method of moments (GMM). Because we are also interested in our time-
invariant regressors, we specified a system of two equations: one with the variables in levels and
the other with the variables in first differences. As valid instruments for two of the endogenous
variables (lagged productivity and institutional quality) we use lagged values of the given
variables in levels for the equation in first differences and in differences for the variables in
levels. For Openness we continue to use the ‘‘gravity-derived’’ instrument. Column 7 shows the
results when a GMM system is estimated. This last model is specified as a dynamic model,
because the corresponding static model did not pass the specification test, and, therefore, the
lagged dependent variable is also introduced as a regressor.
We conclude that the best estimates with inclusion of Real Openness are the GMM system
with time effects. There is support for a statistically significant impact of Institutional Quality
on productivity in almost all specifications including Openness or Real Openness. Real Openness
appears as statistically significant in all specifications. Distance from the equator remains
statistically significant across specifications. Population is also statistically significant in most
cases, indicating this measure of economy size/scale also explains productivity performance.
Area, while significant using Openness in three specifications, is insignificant when Real
openness is included in the specification, offering limited support for the role for scale, available
resources, and perhaps internal trade in explaining productivity.
An interesting aspect of our results is that in some of the panel estimations (fe, re, and HT
in Table 5) we find Population negatively signed and significant, whereas Area is positively
signed and significant (re and HT in Table 5). A larger area can have a positive impact on
productivity through increased natural resources and/or a negative effect via lower intracountry
trade. Focusing on country size and holding population density constant (population/area) the
effect of country size on productivity would be the sum of both the log of population and the
log of area coefficients (Frankel and Romer 1999). From the panel results presented in Table 5
we identify a negative scale effect in part of our results, because the coefficient of population is
greater in magnitude than the coefficient on area. However, this result is not found in the
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GMM system estimations because only population is significant and the effect is positive rather
than negative.
Robustness
First, we tested for the robustness of our results to the inclusion of outliers. The results of
our sensitivity analysis using the GMM system estimator are provided in Table 6.23 Statistical
significance of Real Openness appears robust (although in the case of non-OECD countries, the
confidence level is 10%). Findings for Institutional quality indicate statistical insignificance in
the case of OECD countries, which may result from the nature of the instrument and its
measurement, or indicate that these countries have reached the critical level of institutional
quality beyond which changes generate no measurable impact on labor productivity. Rodrik
(2006) used the term ‘‘binding constraints’’ to describe such impacts. Population is significant
and positively signed, and Area remains statistically insignificant over the entire set of analyses.
Distance from the equator is not statistically significant in most cases.
We also investigated whether countries with a low Institutional Quality (20% lowest scores)
benefit less in labor productivity terms from trade than countries with higher scores (Bormann,
Busse, and Neuhaus 2006). We created a dummy variable (DIQual) that takes a value of one if a
country belongs to the 20% bottom quintile, and equals zero otherwise. We interact this
dummy with Real Openness and add both to the list of explanatory variables. The new
specification is given by
log
PPP GDPit
Workforceit
 
~aiza1Tradeitza2 log DScaleitza3 log Areaitza4IQualit
za5Xizza6DIQualitza7Tradeit|DIQualitzuit:
ð4:1Þ
Column 6 of Table 6 shows both trade and institutional quality variables have a positive
influence on productivity; the coefficients are both significant at the 1% level. The dummy
DIQual and the interactive term Trade*DIQual are both insignificant, showing no evidence that
trade has a negative impact on productivity in the countries with low-quality institutions.
We reestimated the extended model for alternative threshold levels but increasing it to
30%, 40%, and 50% did not change the results—the interactive term was always insignificant.
Contrary to Bormann, Busse, and Neuhaus (2006) we find no evidence that countries with the
worst quality of institutions are unable to benefit from trade.
We also recognize that it is possible that the importance of trade in explaining labor
productivity may also be related to country size. A large country might be closed to trade but
still maintain high productivity because of the internal, within-country opportunities for trade.
The corollary is that a small country that is closed may suffer large relative productivity losses.
This possibility calls for an interaction term between trade and country size. The last column of
Table 6 estimates the model adding such an interaction term. The negatively signed coefficient
indicates that trade has a positive effect on labor productivity, but this effect decreases for more
populated countries.24 Although the impact is small, measured as a coefficient of 20.07
(relative to the estimated effect of trade on productivity of 0.77), it does provide support for the
argument that market size confers productivity advantages on larger countries that would be
23 Results for each of the five years are not provided here but were similar.
24 We thank a referee for suggesting this extension.
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Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis: Productivity Equation for Different Subsamples and for the
Extended Model (GMM System)
GMMSa HKLSa OECD Non-OECD
Extended
Model 1
Extended
Model 2
lprod (21) 0.802* 0.835* 0.847* 0.883* 0.819* 0.839*
13.406 14.395 43.351 17.596 13.572 12.468
lropen 0.159+ 0.125+ 0.104+ 0.101. 0.134+ 0.771+
2.58 2.055 2.1 1.454 2.154 2.194
IQual 0.051* 0.051* 20.008 0.097* 0.059* 0.038.
3.141 3.397 20.349 6.46 3.582 1.76
lpop 0.026+ 0.027+ 0.029* 0.033. 0.024+ 0.245.
2.335 2.446 4.681 1.773 2.478 1.956
larea 0.008 0.001 0.011 0.01 0.006 0.003
0.826 0.073 1.197 0.98 0.685 0.266
ldisteq 0.042+ 0.044+ 0.133. 0.015 0.038+ 0.034
2.05 2.209 2.051 0.828 2.003 1.434
daustrasia 20.012 20.001 0.101 20.01 20.014 20.05
20.289 20.036 1.614 20.165 20.375 20.669
dafrica 20.136 20.096 20.026 20.117 20.068
21.626 21.241 20.409 21.459 20.72
deurope 0.022 0.021 0.02 0.139* 0.027 0.022
0.642 0.65 0.28 3.15 0.858 0.438
y90 0.008 0.009 0.014 20.002 0.011 0.012
0.506 0.558 1.274 20.099 0.665 0.801
y95 20.036. 20.029 20.033+ 20.048+ 20.032 20.022
21.917 21.519 22.419 22.28 21.653 21.18
y2000 0.002 0.008 0.085* 20.065* 20.001 0.024
0.092 0.392 4.058 23.059 20.048 1.177
dIQual 20.034
20.146
tdIQual 0.035
0.407
tlpop 20.066+
22.031
cons 0.819+ 0.701. 0.951* 20.144 0.726. 21.486
1.99 1.785 3.665 20.439 1.761 21.507
N 395 387 98 288 395 395
j 33 33 32 34 35 34
ar1p 0.003 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.000
ar2p 0.818 0.735 0.976 0.896 0.745 0.385
hansenp 0.590 0.330 0.940 0.518 0.415 0.875
T-statistics are reported below each coefficient, and ., +, and * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. Dependent variable lprod is log of real labor productivity, GDP per person employed. lropen is
real openness defined as the log of trade at exchange rate US$ relative to GDP at PPP US$, IQual is institutional quality
constructed using four components of the EFW index, lpop is the log of population, larea is the area of the country in
natural logs, and ldisteq is the distance from the equator in natural logs. dafrica, deurope, and daustrasia are regional
dummies that take the value of one when a given country is located in the region, and zero otherwise. dIQual is a dummy
that takes the value of one when the IQual variable belongs to the lower 20% quintile of the distribution. tdIQual 5
dIQual * lropen and tlpop 5 lpop * lropen.
a HKLS denotes Hong Kong, Luxembourg, and Singapore, which we omitted as outliers from our data sample
(following Frankel and Romer 1999), with marginal impact on the coefficient for trade and no impact on the coefficient
for Institutional Quality.
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difficult if not impossible for smaller countries to imitate, irrespective of their propensity to
trade.25
Finally, to compare our results with previous research Table 7 presents findings using
1985 data to allow for a comparison with Frankel and Romer (1999) and Noguer and Siscart
(2005). Models 1 and 2 in Table 7 are comparable to models 1 and 2 in Noguer and Siscart
(2005, p. 450) and to Frankel and Romer (1999, p. 387). We obtain generally similar results
using our slightly different sample of countries. The trade coefficient is close to unity when the
model is estimated using OLS and considering only population and area as additional
explanatory variables. In addition, using instrumental variables the coefficient increases to 1.85
in our results (comparable to 1.62 in Frankel and Romer 1999 and 2.59 in Noguer and Siscart
2005). Similar to the findings in Noguer and Siscart (2005) the trade coefficient is significantly
reduced when institutional quality is added as an additional regressor (models 5 and 6 in
Table 7). Focusing on 1985, our research supports the contention that gains historically
attributed to trade capture instead the roles of institutions and geography.
It is clear, however, that inclusion of our preferred measure of trade (preferred in the
context of the Balassa-Samuelson effects evident in our sample data) and our preferred measure
of Institutional Quality generate, in Model 5, a statistically insignificant coefficient on the trade
variable with the dependent variable of living standards. The weight of evidence generated by
our estimations in total, however, leads us to conclude that the empirical results for 1985 do not
reflect the strong general tendency of trade impacting positively, in its economic significance,
on income and productivity. Furthermore, the evidence generated by Model 6 in this table also
indicates the importance of the choice of measures of Institutional Quality because with the
inclusion of the component representing Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights in the
Economic Freedom of the World Index, a finding of a statistically significant coefficient on trade
results.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Empirically, a range of results using different techniques across different country samples
yield alternative results in terms of how trade relates to growth and productivity. We add to this
literature using the real openness measure as a determinant of labor productivity applied in a
cross-country panel setting and using a rich data set over the 1980–2000 period. Our findings
over this period support the conclusion that trade is significantly positively related to labor
productivity. Without the addition of geography controls, we find that an upward bias on the
coefficient on trade is evident. Similarly if a measure of institutions is omitted, productivity
gains attributed to trade are overstated.
25 We also estimated the extended model specification using OLS and 2SLS yearly and for the whole panel. To conserve
space, results are not reported here but are available on request from the authors. When using OLS, the two new
variables are almost always insignificant, and trade remains positively associated with productivity levels, in most
years, with a higher coefficient. When using 2SLS, the dummy and the interactive term are always insignificant. For
the whole panel, the two additional variables are significant (and with the expected signs) when IV-random-effects are
employed. However, the Hausman test indicates that only the fixed-effects results are consistent when instrumental
variables are not used.
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Our finding that trade is a statistically significant explanatory variable for labor
productivity across our sample of countries, when geography controls and institutional quality
are included, emerges from 1990 onward. The results from our preferred panel estimates
suggest that a one-percentage-point increase in trade, measured as real openness, raises
productivity by 0.16% in the short term—more modest than in other results—while the
coefficient for the long term is 0.80 (0.16/(120.80), more in line with previous findings in cross-
sectional studies. The size of this coefficient is economically significant because a 1% increase in
trade (i.e., real openness) leads to an increase of 0.8% in labor productivity.
Although our findings relate to panel estimation, the results of comparison for 1985 place
our results in the context of related research. We conclude that gains historically attributed to
trade capture instead the roles of institutions and geography, and the trade coefficient is
Table 7. Comparison with Other Results: 1985
Dep. Var.: lgdpp
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
OLS IV IV IV IV IV
lropen 0.933* 1.846* 1.357* 0.892* 0.448 0.582.
6.101 7.943 5.069 3.177 1.234 1.781
lpop 0.256* 0.412* 0.244* 0.225+ 0.03 0.089
3.392 5.242 2.941 2.5 0.277 1.059
larea 20.064 0 20.018 20.023 0.043 0.025
21.018 20.005 20.278 20.357 0.944 0.552
ldisteq 0.312* 0.125 0.138 0.144
3.147 1.311 1.539 1.625
daustrasia 20.744* 20.533* 20.511*
23.222 22.829 23.239
dafrica 21.160* 20.976* 21.084*
26.56 25.557 26.607
deurope 0.095 0.146 20.241
0.381 0.642 21.426
IQual 0.249+
2.437
a2_ 0.175*
3.691
cons 3.440* 21.674 2.153 4.058+ 5.120* 4.887*
2.962 21.076 1.17 2.331 3.077 2.629
R2 0.33 0.038 0.338 0.614 0.705 0.757
N 105 105 105 105 99 94
j 18.765 22.161 6.697 5.955 4.501
jp 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.051 0.105
estat 5.342 0.623 0.757 0.008 0.252
estatp 0.021 0.430 0.384 0.927 0.616
T-statistics are reported below each coefficient, and., + and * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Dependent variable lgdpp is log of real GDP per person (from Penn World Tables 6.2). lropen is real
openness defined as the log of trade at exchange rate US$ relative to GDP at PPP US$, IQual is institutional quality
constructed using four components of the EFW index, lpop is the log of population, larea is the area of the country in
natural logs, and ldisteq is the distance from the equator in natural logs. dafrica, deurope, and daustrasia are regional
dummies that take the value of one when a given country is located in the region, and zero otherwise. Hansen J test of
overidentifying restrictions, acceptance of the null hypothesis, indicates that the instruments are valid (results indicate
acceptance of H0). The last two rows report the Durbin-Wu-Hausman of endogeneity of lropen and IQual and the
associated probability of acceptance (the results from the tests indicate in most cases acceptance of H0). A2_ is one of the
components of the EFWI called ‘‘legal structure and security of property rights.’’
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significantly reduced when institutional quality is added as an additional explanatory variable
in an analysis of living standards (GDP per capita).
Additionally, we find no evidence to imply that countries with the lowest quality
institutions do not benefit from trade, although the impact of trade increases when controlling
for those countries with lowest institutional quality. Our robustness analysis raises questions
about the role of institutions for OECD countries and points to the possibility of these
countries having reached a critical level of institutions required to facilitate high labor
productivity. This highlights the need for further research.
We find support for a scale effect in our panel regressions (GMM system) as the
population variable appears with a statistically significant and positively signed coefficient, in
support of a positive effect of country size on labor productivity. Taken together with the
finding that our interaction term between trade and country size is decreasing with country size
this indicates that the theoretical rationale for inclusion of the variable in terms of an
absorption effect finds empirical support here.
We find a robust relationship between institutional quality and labor productivity across
our entire sample, being more pronounced in the latter periods. It is possible that data quality
issues arise in the 1980s, and we know that few reliable measures for institutions exist that are
older than 10 years. In using a composite measure of institutions over the time period of this
study we sought to take a comprehensive account of their effect in the trade-productivity
relationship. While focusing on individual components was not possible because of correlations
of the individual components and trade in our study, further research should target an
examination of the nuanced nature of the channels through which these impact on productivity
and income.
Empirical studies in this area must grapple further with how best to measure Institutional
Quality, given its broad coverage and definition, and attempt to identify more specifically the
elements that matter most for income and productivity. Nonetheless, the finding that trade
matters significantly for national productivity is a strong result from our analyses.
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Appendix
Figure A1. Real Openness (in logs) versus Constructed Trade Measure
748 Eleanor Doyle and Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso
Table A1. List of Countries Included in Analyses
List of Countries: 1980–1990 Additional Countries 1995, 2000
Albania Jordan Armenia
Argentina Kenya Azerbaijan
Australia Madagascar Bulgaria
Austria Malawi Croatia
Bahamas Malaysia Georgia
Bangladesh Mali Kazakhstan
Barbados Mauritius Kyrgyz Republic
Belize Mexico Latvia
Benin Morocco Lithuania
Bolivia Namibia Luxembourg
Botswana Nepal Macedonia
Brazil the Netherlands Russia
Burundi New Zealand Slovenia
Cameroon Nicaragua Ukraine
Canada Niger
Chad Nigeria
Chile Norway
China Pakistan
Colombia Panama
Congo, Republic of Papua New Guinea
Costa Rica Paraguay
Cyprus Peru
Denmark Philippines
Dominican Republic Poland
Ecuador Portugal
Egypt Romania
El Salvador Rwanda
Fiji Senegal
Finland Sierra Leone
France Singapore
Gabon South Africa
Germany South Korea
Ghana Spain
Greece Sri Lanka
Guatemala Sweden
Guinea-Bissau Switzerland
Haiti Syria
Honduras Tanzania
Hong Kong Thailand
Hungary Togo
Iceland Trinidad and Tobago
India Tunisia
Indonesia Turkey
Iran Uganda
Ireland United Kingdom
Israel United States
Italy Uruguay
Jamaica Venezuela
Japan Zambia
Productivity, Trade, and Institutions 749
Table A2. OLS Main Results
Real Openness Nominal Openness
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
lopen 0.539* 0.500* 0.502* 0.507* 0.540* 0.468* 0.252 0.267. 0.063 0.246.
3.977 3.343 4.496 4.006 5.261 2.667 1.483 1.788 0.437 1.78
lpop 20.03 20.027 0.022 20.006 0.014 20.08 20.114 20.067 20.097 20.053
20.416 20.393 0.411 20.099 0.287 21.089 21.62 21.014 21.461 20.921
larea 0.052 0.071 0.026 0.062 0.051 0.093 0.088 0.054 0.062 0.049
0.898 1.357 0.527 1.195 1.007 1.548 1.568 1.013 1.091 0.927
IQual 0.154+ 0.190+ 0.226* 0.251* 0.329* 0.220* 0.276* 0.369* 0.435* 0.527*
2.097 2.444 3.068 3.239 4.298 3.175 4.152 6.471 8.268 9.27
ldisteq 0.211. 0.168 0.136 0.172 0.155 0.157 0.145 0.159 0.151 0.155
1.689 1.578 1.296 1.531 1.505 1.295 1.287 1.343 1.213 1.309
daustrasia 20.639* 20.462+ 20.498* 20.266 20.116 20.573+ 20.418. 20.366. 20.108 20.054
23.227 22.517 23.093 21.575 20.725 22.438 21.923 21.765 20.515 20.268
dafrica 21.401* 21.053* 20.980* 20.837* 20.688* 21.258* 21.071* 20.850* 20.707* 20.757*
26.015 24.935 24.971 24.214 23.507 25.796 25.242 24.337 23.535 23.803
deurope 20.156 0.041 20.037 0.036 0.097 0.195 0.245 0.24 0.387. 0.301
20.654 0.211 20.212 0.182 0.523 0.835 1.177 1.229 1.816 1.396
cons 7.079* 6.727* 6.486* 5.986* 5.197* 6.521* 7.377* 6.668* 7.019* 5.320*
8.394 7.46 10.41 9.735 8.432 5.687 6.29 6.523 7.088 5.593
R2 0.642 0.655 0.729 0.732 0.762 0.599 0.61 0.672 0.672 0.702
N 98 98 99 107 110 98 98 99 107 110
F 32.636 43.966 67.149 62.611 79.359 30.365 43.811 45.442 36.585 42.110
aic 202.258 196.480 177.189 188.098 187.943 213.452 208.504 195.935 209.587 212.607
bic 225.523 219.745 200.545 212.153 212.247 236.717 231.769 219.291 233.643 236.912
rmse 0.650 0.631 0.567 0.560 0.547 0.688 0.671 0.623 0.619 0.612
T-statistics are presented below coefficients, and., +, and * denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Dependent variable lprod is log of real labor productivity, GDP per person employed. lopen for real
openness is the log of trade at exchange rate US$ relative to GDP at PPP US$; for nominal openness lopen is the sum of
exports and imports expressed as a fraction of GDP, in nominal terms. IQual is institutional quality proxied with four
elements of the Economic Freedom of the World Index, lpop is the log of population, larea is the area of the country in
natural logs, and ldisteq is the distance from the equator in natural logs. dafrica, deurope, and daustrasia are regional
dummies that take the value of one when a given country is located in the region, and zero otherwise.
750 Eleanor Doyle and Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso
References
Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson. 2006. Persistence of power, elites and institutions. Unpublished paper, MIT,
Cambridge, MA.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. The colonial origins of comparative development: An
empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91:1369–1401.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in
the making of the modern world income distribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107:1231–94.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Yunyong Thaicharoen. 2003. Institutional causes,
macroeconomic symptoms: Volatility, crises and growth. Journal of Monetary Economics 50:49–123.
Alcala, Francisco, and Antonio Ciccone. 2004. Trade and productivity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119:613–46.
Anderson, James E., and Eric van Wincoop. 2003. Gravity with gravitas: A solution to the border puzzle. American
Economic Review 93:170–92.
Balassa, Bela. 1964. The purchasing power parity doctrine: A reappraisal. Journal of Political Economy 72:584–96.
Barro, Robert J. 1997. Determinants of economic growth: A cross-country empirical study. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Borrmann, Axel, Matthias Busse, and Silke Neuhaus. 2006. Institutional quality and the gains from trade. Kyklos
59:345–68.
Connolly, Michelle. 2003. The dual nature of trade: Measuring its impact on imitation and growth. Journal of
Development Economics 72:31–55.
de Haan, Jakob, Susanna Lundstrom, and Jan-Egbert Sturm. 2006. Market-oriented institutions and policies and
economic growth: A critical survey. Journal of Economic Surveys 20:157–91.
Dollar, David, and Aart Kraay. 2003. Institutions, trade and growth. Journal of Monetary Economics 50:133–62.
Doyle, Eleanor. 2001. Export–output causality and the role of exports in Irish growth: 1950–1997. International
Economic Journal 15:31–54.
Easterly, William. 2001. The elusive quest for growth: economists’ adventures and misadventures in the tropics. Cambridge,
MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Frankel, Jeffrey A. 1997. Regional trading blocs in the world economic system. Washington, D.C.: Institute for
International Economics.
Frankel, Jeffrey A., and David Romer. 1999. Does trade cause growth. American Economic Review 89:379–99.
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1991. Innovation and growth in the global economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gwartney, James D. 2009. Institutions, economic freedom, and cross-country differences in performance. Southern
Economic Journal 75:937–56.
Gwartney, James D., Randall G. Holcombe, and Robert A. Lawson. 2004. Economic freedom, institutional quality, and
cross-country differences in income and growth. Cato Journal 24:205–33.
Gwartney, James D., and Robert A. Lawson. 2003. Economic freedom of the world: 2003 annual report. Vancouver:
Fraser Institute.
Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones. 1999. Why do some countries produce so much output per worker than others?
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:83–116.
Helpman, Elhanan, and Paul Krugman. 1985. Market structure and foreign trade: Increasing returns, imperfect
competition, and the international economy. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. 2006. Penn world table version 6.2. Centre for International
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), September.
Irwin, Douglas A., and Marko Tervio. 2002. Does trade raise income? Evidence from the twentieth century. Journal of
International Economics 58:1–18.
Kaldor, Nicholas. 1967. Strategic factors in economic development. New York: State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, Cornell University.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2006. Measuring governance using cross-country perceptions
data. In International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman. Northampton
MA: Edward Elgar, pp. 52–104.
Keefer, Philip, and Stephen Knack. 1995. Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using alternative
institutional measures. Economics and Politics 7:207–27.
Kunst, Robert, and Dalia Marin. 1989. On exports and productivity: A causal analysis. Review of Economics and
Statistics 71:699–703.
Landes, David S. 1998. The wealth and poverty of nations: Why some are so rich and some so poor. New York: W. W. Norton.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1997. Legal determinants of external
finance. Journal of Finance 52:1131–50.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of
Political Economy 106:1113–55.
Levchenko, Andrei. 2007. Institutional quality and international trade, Review of Economic Studies 74:791–819.
Productivity, Trade, and Institutions 751
Linneman, Hans. 1966. An econometric study of international trade flows. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Mauro, Paulo. 1995. Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110:681–12.
Medina-Smith, Emilio J. 2001. Is the export-led growth hypothesis valid for developing countries? A case study of Costa
Rica. Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Series, No. 7, United Nations.
McArthur, John W., and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 2001. Institutions and geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson 2000. NBER Working Paper No. 8114.
Myint, Hla. 1958. The classical theory of trade and the underdeveloped countries. Economic Journal 68:317–37.
Noguer, Marta, and Mark Siscart. 2005. Trade raises income: A precise and robust result. Journal of International
Economics 65:447–60.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
North, Douglass C. 1997. Economic performance through time. In Nobel prize lecture from Nobel lectures, economics
1991–1995, edited by Torsten Persson. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Accessed July 2009. Available
at nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html.
Rivera-Batiz, Luis A., and Paul M. Romer. 1991. International trade with endogenous technological change. European
Economic Review 35:971–1001.
Rodriguez, Francisco R., and Dani Rodrik. 2001. Trade policy and economic growth: A sceptic’s guide to the cross-
national evidence. In Macroeconomics Annual 2000, edited by Ben Bernanke and Kenneth S. Rogoff. MIT Press
for NBER.
Rodrik, Dani. 2006. Goodbye Washington consensus, hello Washington confusion? A review of the World Bank’s
Economic growth in the 1990s: learning from a decade of reform. Journal of Economic Literature 44:973–87.
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Institutional rule: The primacy of institutions over
geography and integration in economic development. Journal of Economic Growth 9:131–65.
Romer, Paul M. 1990. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy 98(Part 2):S71–S102.
Rose, Andrew K. 2005. Does the WTO make trade more stable? Open Economies Review 16:7–22.
Sachs, Jeffrey. 2000. Notes on a new sociology of economic development. In Culture matters: How values shape human
progress, edited by Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington. New York: Basic Books, pp. 15–29.
Sachs, Jeffrey, and John A. Warner. 1995. Economic reform and the process of global integration. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 26:1–18.
Sachs, Jeffrey, and John A. Warner. 1999. The big push, natural resource booms and growth. Journal of Development
Economics 59:43–76.
Sachs, Jeffrey, and John A. Warner. 2001. Natural resources and economic development: The curse of natural resources.
European Economic Review 45:827–38.
Samuelson, Paul. 1964. Theoretical notes on trade problems. Review of Economics and Statistics 46:145–54.
Temple, Jonathan. 1999. The new growth evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 37:112–56.
Yanikkaya, Halit. 2003. Trade openness and economic growth: A cross-country empirical investigation. Journal of
Development Economics 72:57–89.
World Bank. 2005. World development indicators. Washington: World Bank.
752 Eleanor Doyle and Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso
